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Dworkin's Theory of
Constitutional Law
By ROBERT P. CHURCHILL*

Professor Dworkin's arguments in Taking Rights Seriously1
reveal the great subtlety of logical design and analytical powers of
thought which have made a brilliant reputation for their author. In
many ways the book is a major contribution to a philosophical understanding of the law and the role of the judiciary in a constitutional democracy. Dworkin not only brings to legal philosophy the
most penetrating treatment to date of individual rights, but also
illuminates most of the philosophical puzzles connected with legal
activity: for example, the problems of obligation and civil disobedience, the relationship of law and morality, and the justification of
judicial decisionmaking. However, Taking Rights Seriously must, I
believe, leave the careful reader puzzled about the substantiality
and coherence of the author's philosophy of constitutional law. Indeed, it might have been hoped that Professor Dworkin would go
further toward developing a theory of constitutional law which
would serve as a genuine alternative to those theories criticized by
supporters of an activist and liberal judiciary.
In 1972, Dworkin took the activists to task for failing to make
a sufficient case against those who argue for judicial restraint.2 He
asserted that a theory of constitutional law could make no genuine
* The author wishes to thank Robert E. Park, Frederic R. Kellogg and John P. Giraudo
for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
1.

R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SEROUSLY (1977) [hereinafter cited as TRS].

2. Dworkin, The Jurisprudence of Richard Nixon, N.Y. REv. BooKs, May 4, 1972, at
27-35, reprinted in TRS, supra note 1, at 131-49 as ch. 5, "Constitutional Cases."
I shall use the terms."judicial restraint" and "judicial activism" throughout in the same
way as they are used by Dworkin (e.g., TRS, supra note 1, at 137) since his usage fairly
represents the difference between the two camps. Advocates of judicial restraint tend to see
the function of judicial review as fraught with peril and hence to be exercised with great
restraint. Advocates of judicial activism argue that the judge's task is to identify democratic
values in the constitutional plan and to work them into life in the cases that reach them.
See C.

BLACK,

PERSPECTIVES IN CONsTrruTIoNAL LAW 3 (1970).
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advance until it came face-to-face with the question of rights and
based a defense of liberal judicial activity on individual rights
against the state. There was, Dworkin said, a need for "a fusion of
constitutional law and moral theory, a connection that, incredibly,
has yet to take place." 3 Dworkin has done much to fuse law and
moral theory in parts of Taking Rights Seriously. Indeed, the centerpiece of the book is Dworkin's "rights thesis,' 4 which attempts
to be both a theory of the rights of individuals and a justification
of the process of adjudication Dworkin advocates. Dworkin believes that the process of judicial reasoning he advocates and illustrates through references to his mythical judge, Hercules, is a process of adjudication which takes rights seriously. It is intended to
be a theory of adjudication thoroughly grounded upon a theory of
moral rights. Dworkin's claim is dramatically strong: even in hard
cases judges can find one "right answer," 5 the answer dictated by
the rights of the contestants before the court.
Of course, Dworkin has not developed a theory of adjudication
in a vacuum. His theory is also intended to be a justification of
what has come to be called "judicial activism."' He seeks to
demonstrate that some particular decisions made by the Supreme
Court have been correct; in general, he is in favor of the activism of
the Warren Court7 and much less pleased by the work of the Burger Court (and especially the views of some justices on the Burger
Courts). Thus, after Chapter 4 ("Hard Cases") Dworkin in Chapter
5 ("Constitutional Cases") attacks what he calls "Nixon's Jurisprudence." My criticism of Dworkin arises from the incompatibility of
the argument in the latter essay, "Constitutional Cases," with the
essay titled "Hard Cases."These two essays (and I think, the col3. TRS, supra note 1, at 149.
4. See TRS, supra note 1, at 82-90.
5. "My arguments suppose that there is often a single right answer to complex questions of law and political morality." TRS, supra note 1, at 279. See generally id. at 81130,

279-90.
Hard cases occur "[w]hen a particular lawsuit cannot be brought under a clear rule of
law, laid down by some institution in advance ....
when no settled rule disposes of the
case. . . ." Id. at 81.
6. See TRS, supra note 1, at i31-49. See also note 2 supra.
7. "I shall also try to show how the general theory of adjudication I described and
defended in Chapter 4 supports the constitutional philosophy, if not the particular decisions, of the Warren Court." TRS, supra note 1, at 132. See generally id. at 131-49.
8. In particular, see Dworkin's criticism of Justice Rehnquist in Dworkin, How to
Read the Civil Rights Act, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Dec. 20, 1979, 37-43.
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lection as a whole), when taken together, present inconsistent tendencies of thought which sometimes leave the author at cross-purposes. Dworkin is not aware of the tension between his rights
thesis and his advocacy of judicial activism. The confusion generated by this tension involves no formal fallacy, nor strictly speaking, any logical inconsistency; 9 yet it is more serious than a mere
hiatus in the argument or an ignoratio elenchi. It is, as Kant might
have said, a case of the will being in conflict with itself, for as I
shall show, the argument Dworkin would make about the role of
the Court requires that he adopt a subsidiary thesis which is in
conflict with his rights thesis. One expects to find a reconciliation
of these conflicting tendencies upon careful analysis of the theory
of rights Dworkin elaborates in Taking Rights Seriously. In the
end, however, one can only lament that Dworkin has not yet
brought one appreciably closer to believing that his views constitute a single coherent theory of constitutional law. My present objective is to show why the essays in Taking Rights Seriously do not
comprise a cohesive philosophy of law.
My argument will be presented in five parts. In Part I, I shall
consider Dworkin's objectives in advancing the rights thesis, as
well as his strategy for justifying judicial activism. I shall show
that Dworkin's attempt to defend judicial activism leads him to
develop a further thesis about modifications of our conceptions of
rights and the role of these changing conceptions in legal reasoning. It is this second, subsidiary thesis-the relativism thesis-which pulls against the rights thesis. In Part H, I shall explain
in more detail why the relativism thesis is incompatible with the
rights thesis. I shall introduce some elements of the judicial philosophy of Hugo Black to clarify my criticism of Dworkin, and shall
lay the foundation for understanding the analysis of rights Dworkin must develop in order to reconcile the rights thesis and the
relativism thesis. This analysis of rights is discussed in Part III,
and is a view of individual rights which would allow Dworkin to
overcome my initial criticism. However, this analysis of rights creates difficulties for the rights thesis itself. In order to maintain that
judges can get right answers, even when they run out of legal rules
in hard cases, Dworkin must show that these decisions are justified
9. In general, someone commits a fallacy of inconsistency if he reasons from premises
that necessarily could not all be true because they logically imply contradictory consequences. See S. BARKER, ELEMENTS OF LOGIC 188-89 (2d ed. 1974).
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as protecting the rights of individuals. I explain in Part IV why
Dworkin can no longer make this argument. Finally, in Part V, I
return to the theory of individual rights Dworkin develops in Taking Rights Seriously. In my view this is the weakest aspect of
Dworkin's philosophy of law. There are a number of reasons why
this theory of individual rights is insufficient to provide the philosophical support Dworkin seeks to give judicial activism. These
reasons are not discussed in this article, though I do suggest that a
defense of judicial activism requires a theory of individual rights
quite different from the one Dworkin accepts.
Dworkin's views have been the subject of heated debate; this
is particularly true of Dworkin's account of judicial decisionmaking. 10 However, the deficiencies I discuss have not previously been
commented upon by Dworkin's critics. This is perhaps a consequence of the gradual development of Dworkin's constitutional
philosophy throughout a number of separate influential articles,
and the focus of attention upon specific points of controversy
rather than upon the structure of the argument as a whole. Another reason might be the diversity of questions Dworkin addresses
and the growth and modification of his position over time.,
My criticisms, if accurate and fair, might best serve as a guide
to the problems inherent in defending judicial activism based on
Dworkin's premises.
10. For criticisms of Dworkin's account of judicial decisionmaking in the earlier paper,
The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. Rnv. 14 (1967), reprintedin TRS, supra note 1, at 14-45,
see Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823 (1972); Sartorius, Social
Policy and Judicial Legislation, 8 AM. PHILOSOPHICAL Q. 151 (1971). In TRS, supra note 1,

at 46-80, Dworkin responds to these and other critical reviews.
For criticisms of the theory as it developed in Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. Rnv.
1057 (1975), reprinted in TRS, supra note 1, at 81-130, see Mackie, The Third Theory of
Law, 7 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFF. 3 (1977); Perry, Contested Concepts and Hard Cases, 88
ETHICS 20 (1977); Raz, ProfessorDworkin's Theory of Rights, 26 POLITICAL STUD. 23 (1978).
Both TRS, supra note 1, at 279-90, and Dworkin, No Right Answer, in LAw Mo nrry AND
SocmTY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF H.L.A. HART (1977) contain Dworkin's response to some of

these criticisms.
11. The essay ConstitutionalCases, for example, was primarily developed as an attack
on what Dworkin called "Nixon's Jurisprudence," and was intended for publication in 1972,
while Hard Cases is a revised version of Dworkin's inaugural lecture as Professor of Juris-

prudence at Oxford University in June 1971, first published in 1975 in HarvardLaw Review,
supra note 10.
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I
One of Dworkin's major objectives in Taking Rights Seriously
is to provide a philosophical defense for the claim that both historically and under our present government (which is in some respects more and in other respects less democratic and constitutional than in the past) individuals have fundamental moral rights
which cannot legitimately be invaded by the government.12 This
claim is not mere rhetoric, for the invasion of individuals' moral
rights cannot be justified by the right of a democratic majority to
work its will. As Dworkin makes clear, such a right must be a right
to do something even when a democratic majority thinks it would
be wrong to do it, and even when the majority would be worse off
for having it done.1 As a corollary of this claim, Dworkin argues
that the role of the federal courts and especially the Supreme
Court is, in large part, to enforce the rights of individuals against
the government. The judicial role is neither to give deference to
the other branches of government, nor to "legislate" through the
use of judicial discretion, but to enforce the rights of those who
come before the court. Even in hard cases, where a lawsuit cannot
be brought under a clear rule of law laid down in advance by some
institution,14 it remains the judge's duty to discover what the
rights of the contesting parties are.
To achieve his objective Dworkin must overcome the challenge
posed by a theory of judicial restraint. In particular, Dworkin must
respond to two attempts to justify judicial restraint, each of which
rests upon a different philosophical ground.
One version of judicial restraint is grounded in a profound political or moral skepticism. It charges that a program of judicial
activism which would enforce individual rights against the government presupposes a certain objectivity of moral principle-that.
persons do indeed have moral rights against the state. The skeptic
says to the activist: "[o]nly if such moral rights exist in some sense
can activism be justified as a program based on something beyond
the judge's personal preferences." 5 The skeptic argues, however,
that in fact individuals have only such legal rights as the law
12.
13.
14.
15.

See TRS, supra note 1, at 133.
Id. at 133, 194.
Id. at 81.
Id. at 138.
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grants them, and no moral rights against the state, or, at best, that
even if such moral rights do exist, one can never know what they
may be since claims about moral rights express nothing more than
the speaker's preferences. The name of Learned Hand has been
associated with this skeptical version of judicial restraint.16
An alternative ground for a theory of restraint is judicial deference. This position allows that citizens do have moral rights
against the state beyond what the law expressly grants them, but
argues that since the weight and nature of these rights are always
debatable, political institutions other than the courts should be responsible for deciding what rights are to be recognized. Rational
persons will inevitably disagree about what these rights are in specific cases; therefore, the soundest democratic principles caution us
to leave final decisions about rights to the legislative process.
While this position has been associated with more than one commentator on the courts, it received a particularly spirited advocacy
17
from the late Professor Alexander Bickel of Yale Law School.
Against the skeptical position advocating restraint, Dworkin
argues for what he calls the "rights thesis."18 This thesis, it appears, has two specific parts: (a) the claim that individuals do in
fact have specific rights which pre-exist judicial decisions and
which are enforced in particular cases, and (b) the claim that it is
the possession by individuals of these rights which ultimately justifies the Court's activist rulings of which Dworkin approves. Thus,
in hard cases, for example, it is the "discovery" of one of the litigants' rights which allows Dworkin to assert that the judges are
neither making law nor indulging their personal preferences. Furthermore, the existence of definite rights is a prerequisite to finding persuasive the assertion that the courts should give effect to
the strongest claim of right, rather than adopting a policy of deference to the legislature or the agencies of government. The rights
thesis is therefore indispensable to Dworkin's argument for judicial
activism.
Dworkin counters the judicial deference theory of judicial restraint with the argument that courts are the public institutions
most likely to be successful in defending individual rights. He ar16. Id. at 140. See L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958).
17. TRS, supra note 1, at 144. See A. BicKEL, THE SUPREME
PROGRESS (1970).
18. See TRS, supra note 1, at 82-90.

COURT AND THE IDEA OF
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gues strenuously against the widely-held view that since in hard
cases judges "make" law, they must make decisions in the same
manner and subject to the same standards as legislators. Dworkin
insists that judges are not, nor should they be, deputy legislators.
The familiar assumption that judges, by going beyond political decisions already made by other organs of government, are legislating, is thoroughly misleading.1 9 Dworkin illustrates this point via a
conceptual distinction which he introduced in his attack on legal
positivism in 1967, a distinction which has subsequently become
commonplace in discussions of legal philosophy. 0
Policies, principles and rules are all standards, but there are
important distinctions between them. A policy is a standard which
sets out a goal to be reached, generally an improvement in some
economic, political or social feature of the community. A principle
is a standard to be observed not because it will advance or secure
an economic, political or social good, but because it is a requirement of justice or fairness or some other dimension of morality.
Rules are standards which set out goals or state requirements of
justice or morality and which (unlike the other standards) apply in
an all-or-nothing manner. Valid rules are decisive if they cover the
facts of a case, whereas the other standards are not. In particular,
principles have a dimension of "weight" which rules lack; a principle may be outweighed without thereby making it invalid or inapplicable to the case. However, the same thing cannot be said of
rules. As Dworkin expresses it: "If the facts a rule stipulates are
given, then either the rule is valid, in which case the answer it supplies must be accepted, or it is not, in which case it contributes
' 21
nothing to the decision.
Dworkin admits that the distinctions he has drawn are primarily heuristic.2 2 For example, the distinction between policies and
principles can easily be conflated. The voters of a state may decide
to make it their policy to pursue some moral objective-they may
adopt a policy that reparations be made for past acts of discrimi19. Dworkin makes this argument frequently. See TRS, supra note 1, at 31-45, 81-90,
123-26. See also Dworkin, Judicial Discretion,60 J. PHILOSOPHY 624 (1963).

20. See TRS, supra note 1, at 22-28, 71-80, 90-100. For discussions elsewhere, see T.
MORAwLrz, THE PHmLOSOPHY OF LAW 114 (1980); D. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRrICISM OF LAW
54 (1977); Wellington, Common Law Rules and ConstitutionalDouble Standards: Some

Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973).
21.
22.

TRS, supra note 1, at 24.
Id. at 22-23.
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nation against members of a minority, for instance. Nevertheless,
the distinctions are useful in indicating the types of considerations
that are to be decisive in justifying the actions taken by agencies of
the government. For present purposes, it is the distinction between
policies and principles which is important. Policies are supported
by broad objectives which are generally economic and social in
character. Legislators must base their decisions upon arguments of
policy, showing how they would advance or protect the welfare of
the community as a whole. Policy decisions must therefore derive
from political processes designed to produce an accurate expression of the nature and intensity of the different interests of which
account must be taken. By contrast, principles derive from deeply
felt moral convictions. Arguments of principle fix upon claims of
right, claims which if justified take precedence over considerations
of policy.
Dworkin argues that public policy should respond to popular
preference as well as to shifts in the economic interests of the electorate. However, matters of preference and economic interest
ought not restrict or modify the moral convictions held by the
members of the community. In an important way, moral principles
are beyond the reach of the politics of bargaining, compromise and
pressure-group interest we associate with legislatures. Thus, it is
not inconsistent with democratic theory to maintain that justified
claims of right should restrain the formation and pursuit of public
policy. Those who see the anti-majoritarian effects of some Supreme Court decisions as a threat to democracy have not fully appreciated the difference between arguments of policy and arguments of principle. In our system of government, it is the
responsibility of the appellate courts to ensure that public actions
(as well as private actions) do not violate the fundamental moral
principles and encroach upon the rights of individuals. Judges, who
are insulated from the pressures of politics and the demands of the
majority, are uniquely able to evaluate these arguments of principle.23 Thus, rather than defer to the judgments of other governmental organs, the courts must face the task of determining the
rights of individuals in particular circumstances, according to the
best current conceptions of exactly what these rights should be.
Of course, the role of the Supreme Court which Dworkin advo23. Id. at 85, 141-47.
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cates, exemplified generally by much of the work of the Warren
Court, is not static and conservative, but progressive and forwardlooking. This role leads the Court not so much to the preservation
of specific rights as enumerated by the Constitution and defined in
precedent, as to the expansion of individual rights to fit new circumstances. The Court is to have the creative role of redefining
rights to fit particular circumstances, as it did in expanding the
right to privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut 24 and Roe v. Wade,25
for example. Dworkin speaks of "judicial originality" 26 in describing the activism he advocates, and, at one point in Taking Rights
Seriously, he argues that judicial decisions which permit the invasion of rights are injustices far graver than the social losses in convenience and efficiency which may result from occasional judicial
excesses which "inflate" rights.27
The courts cannot limit themselves to defending historically
defined rights because individual rights are not to be fixed by any
particular historical conception of what those rights should be. Indeed, the very difficulty with the conservative "strict constructionist" position, Dworkin says, is that it makes a strict interpretation
of the Constitution yield a narrow view of constitutional rights.
The modern Supreme Court must not be confined (although
clearly it may be guided) by the views of a limited group (the Constitutional Framers) at a fixed date in history, nor by legislative
and judicial action in the past. The Constitution did not freeze the
Framers' conceptions in time, but left them purposely broad and
indefinite as guiding concepts, the specific meanings of clauses
(such as those in the First Amendment or the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment) to be worked out according to the
best moral conceptions of contemporary time and society.28 Writing early in 1972, and speaking of the Supreme Court case which
was subsequently reported as Furman v. Georgia,2 9 Dworkin said:
The Supreme Court may soon decide ...whether capital punish24. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
25. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
26. See, e.g., TRS, supra note 1, at 84-85.
27. TRS, supra note 1, at 199.
28. "They should work out principles of legality, equality, and the rest, revise these
principles from time to time in the light of what seems to the Court fresh moral insight, and
judge the acts of Congress, the states, and the President accordingly." TRS, supra note 1, at

137.
29.

408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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ment is 'cruel' within the meaning of the constitutional clause
that prohibits 'cruel and unusual punishment'. It would be a mistake for the Court to be much influenced by the fact that when
the clause was adopted capital punishment was standard and unquestioned. That would be decisive if the framers of the clause
had meant to lay down a particular conception of cruelty, because
it would show that the conception did not extend so far. But it is
not decisive of the different question the Court now faces, which
is this: Can the Court, responding to the framers' appeal to the
concept of cruelty, now defend a conception that does not make
death cruel?30
Just as the concept of "cruel" punishment is given content by the
texture of our present debates and moral reflection on the justifiable forms of punishment, so individual rights in particular circumstances are determined by changes in our conceptions of central
values such as liberty, equality and legality, among others.
Thus Dworkin's defense of judicial activism must also embrace
a further thesis which might be called the "conceptual relativist"
thesis, or "relativism" for short. According to this second thesis,
the true scope of an individual's rights in any particular circumstance depends ultimately upon moral conceptions of these rights,
and upon the ability to make moral arguments (as well as legal
arguments) for these rights. Dworkin contends that this way of
looking at moral rights against the state commits us to no "ontological assumptions" about the nature of rights, but instead, "simply shows a claim of right to be a special, in the sense of a restricted, sort of judgment about what is right or wrong for
governments to do."'3 1 The conception of rights embedded in this
thesis allows Dworkin to state "with no sense of strangeness" that
"rights may vary in strength and character from case to case, and
from point to point in history. 3 2 It is, furthermore, appropriate to
use the term "relativism" to describe this thesis for the term signifies (as the thesis maintains) that conceptions of these rights are
affected by considerations that are relative and changing.3 s Of
course, by "relativism" I do not mean that Dworkin embraces any
version of moral skepticism about the existence of rights or our
ability to know what these rights are. The point is rather that de30.
31.
32.
33.

TRS, supra note 1, at 135-36.
Id. at 139.
Id.
Id.
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spite their vague expression in the Constitution and elsewhere,
rights pertain to individuals and are significant in our lives only
when they matter to particular individuals. Since Dworkin believes
that what it means for someone to have a right will change depending upon how we conceive the right to be implicated in a particular problem, rights in practice may change over time and may
vary from one set of circumstances to another. The range of interests which may be protected as rights by the Constitution will always be indefinitely broad and undetermined. Thus, the specific
interests of individuals which become protected as legal rights will
vary according to the context in which the legal problem has arisen
and to our (or the judges') best understanding of constitutional law
as it relates to particular issues."
It should be clear that Dworkin must adopt both the rights
thesis and the relativism thesis if his argument against judicial restraint is to be successful. Without the rights thesis, as I have indicated, he cannot justify activism as based on something more than
judges' preferences or judicial lawmaking; without the relativism
thesis he cannot justify the creative "expansive" role of the courts.
The interconnection between these two theses can be seen clearly
in Dworkin's criticism of prominent tendencies in jurisprudence
during the years of the Nixon Administration. Certain conceptions
of individual rights of the time (for example, conceptions of defen5 ),
dants' rights which would seriously limit the effects of Miranda"
even if persuasive to democratic majorities, must be rejected because they fail to take the rights "seriously" enough. Arguments
for these conceptions, unlike arguments for the conceptions Dworkin supports, do not adequately account for the rights individuals
34. One might be tempted to say that Dworkin is merely making the familiar distinction between moral rights and legal rights. The overlap between the two kinds of rights is
irregular it is commonly accepted that there may be moral rights which either are not protected by the law or are protected only imperfectly. Thus, it might be thought that Dworkin's "relativism" thesis simply maintains that the part of a moral right (e.g., the right to
privacy) which is legally protected varies from circumstance to circumstance with changes in
our conceptions of the nature of privacy. But Dworkin asserts much more than this weak
notion of the relativity of our conceptions. He envisions that when judges make decisions in
hard cases they are not making best guesses as to the rights of the parties involved. If they
have done their reasoning correctly, they get right answers. What they conceive to be the
rights of the parties before them are, in fact, the parties' moral rights, if these conceptions
are appropriately supported by reasons. The judicial decision is justified because it recognizes as law what are in fact the moral rights of the contestants.
35. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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actually possess. Dworkin requires a theory of rights flexible
eilough to support new and emerging conceptions of the nature of
these rights; at the same time, the theory must reject some conceptions of rights and some judicial decisions as unjustifiable because
they do not adequately support or enforce the real character or
nature of these fundamental individual rights.
II
The compelling question at this juncture is whether Dworkin
can consistently maintain both the rights thesis and the relativism
thesis. Dworkin faces the Herculean task of fashioning a justification for judicial activism which can both (a) counter accusations of
subjectivism and judicial "legislation" by showing judicial decisions to be based on the rights individuals actually possess, and (b)
defend, some form of judicial creativity which would reinterpret
and augment our conceptions of those rights as required. As Dworkin has argued, judges enforce rights which the litigants possessed
before judicial decisions were made; if it were otherwise, a claim of
right would seem a mere rationalization for approved judicial
behavior.
Conceptions of these rights must be allowed to grow and expand, however. Otherwise, judges would remain chained to narrow
and inadequate conceptions formed in the past. But while the relativism thesis prompts one to accept change, it also places the future under a cloud of uncertainty. It potentially subjects every
court finding of a right to the charge that the right must give way
to a conception still more adequate or satisfying-ideologically or
morally-of the right in question.
The rights thesis suggests the opposite: that rights have a continuity and a permanence that allows them to withstand changes
in ideology, new visions of "truth," and perceptions of historical
necessity. On the negative side, the rights thesis suggests that
judges exercise restraint in diverging from the "hard core" of a
right, that they proceed with caution, even in the face of a great
social need for equality or distributive justice.
Dworkin borrows from each thesis. He maintains that rights
provide a firm basis for constitutional adjudication, but, in order to
avoid the yoke of the past, he rejects the view that rights are somehow permanent or "fixed" in their characteristics. Dworkin synthesizes a new philosophy of rights which reconciles claims that rights
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are fluid with claims that they are nevertheless sufficiently constant to justify constitutional adjudication. Dworkin attempts a
philosophical analysis of rights which accounts for their perseverance and lasting influence, even through apparent change.
Before examining Dworkin's analysis of rights in detail, however, it is necessary to expose the tension between the rights thesis
and the relativism thesis in as dramatic and unmistakable a manner as possible. This may be done by examining a "theory" of
rights which is familiar to many readers, as it is extracted from the
opinions and papers of the late Supreme Court Justice Hugo
Black.
Like Dworkin, Hugo Black often advocated the protection of
individuals' rights against the excesses of majoritarian democracy,
and in this sense at least, Black was "taking rights seriously."
However, Black's intellectual defense of rights differed markedly
from Professor Dworkin's position.
On numerous occasions Black was the leading spokesman for
an "absolutist" position on the Supreme Court, 6 and in the years
1959-1962, in particular, many First Amendment cases were decided over the eloquent dissents of Black. In one case Justice
Black insisted that "the Bill of Rights means what it says, 8' 7 in
another he noted that, "I read 'no law. . . abridging' to mean no
law abridging," which in Black's view meant that the First Amendment prohibition is complete, exceptionless and unconditional. He
added in Wilkinson v. United States,3 8 "the principles of the First
Amendment are stated in precise and mandatory terms and unless
they are applied in those terms, the freedom of religion, speech,
press, assembly and petition will have no effective protection."3 9
The opposing position, which prevailed frequently during this
period, was that of Justice Felix Frankfurter. Frankfurter took the
view that there are no absolute rights in the First Amendment, nor
elsewhere in the Bill of Rights, and when an interest we believe to
be protected as a constitutional right conflicts with a weightier interest in publicy safety or public order, the courts must permit in36.
view, 37
37.
38.
39.

See Cohn, Justice Black and the FirstAmendment "Absolutes" A Public InterN.Y.U.L. Rav. 549 (1962).
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 143-44 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
365 U.S. 399 (1961).
Id. at 422-23 (Black, J., dissenting).
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fringement of this "right." In Dennis v. United States40 Frankfurter asserted that, "[t]he demands of free speech in a democratic
society as well as the interest in national security are better served
by candid and informed weighing of the competing interests,
within the confines of the judicial process, than by announcing
dogmas too inflexible for the.., problems to be solved.

'41

In contrast to Frankfurter's approach, Justice Black described
certain rights as absolute to preclude their being "balanced"
against countervailing interests such as national security or law enforcement. Certainly Dworkin's thinking must be closer to Black's
thinking in this controversy, not only because Dworkin abhors the
Court's failure to more completely protect individuals' rights (e.g.,
in Dennis), but also because Frankfurter's view of the Court as
"balancing" interests offends Dworkin's important distinction
be42
tween arguments of principle and arguments of policy.

However, Dworkin must also be opposed to Black's philosophy
of constitutional law, because the latter's view requires that those
rights and liberties identified by the Constitution be regarded as
absolute, inflexible and timeless. Black's Constitution was, as Alexander M. Bickel has said, "a compendium of numerous, precisely
framed, generally absolute principles .... -48 Furthermore, the
words of the Constitution were, for Black, explicit limitations on
the power of governmental institutions, and these constitutional
imperatives prevailed over all other lawmaking efforts. The Court's
duty to follow faithfully the dictates of the Constitution was thus a
source of power to scrutinize the activities of the states, as well as
other branches of government, and to intervene or abrogate governmental action.44 This tendency may justify Bickel's reference to
45
Black as a judicial activist, over a range of constitutional issues,
but in the area of the expansion of the meaning of constitutionally
guaranteed rights, Black's adherence to the literal meaning of the
Constitution made him an advocate of judicial restraint. The
words of the Constitution which justified judicial action against the
40. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
41. Id. 524-25 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also Communist Party v. Subversive
Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 90-91 (1961).
42. Dworkin calls the Court's decision to uphold the legality of the Smith Act in Dennis "shameful." TRS, supra note 1, at 148.
43. A. BicKEL, THE MoRALrry OF CONSENT 10 (1975).

44. Id.
45. Id. at 9.
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states were also barriers to judicial "initiative."' "4 Any attempt by
the Court to expand the ambit of constitutional language was
viewed by Black as an usurpation of power. Thus, in the civil
rights field, for example, Black held that poll taxes as prerequisites
for voting, however anti-egalitarian and undemocratic, were not
manifestly forbidden by any constitutional language. Again, while
48
l4 7
Black believed that speech per se, whether libelous or obscene,
was protected to the fullest, he refused to see as constitutionally
protected civil rights picketing or sit-ins which served (Black believed) a coercive communications function. 9 .In his dissent in
Griswold v. Connecticut,50 Black admitted that the state's attempt
to regulate sexual relations among married couples was unwise and
offensive, but there was no right to privacy mentioned in the Constitution, and hence judges could not create one.
All of these examples illustrate Black's unwillingness to give a
"liberal" judicial reading to constitutional provisions-to extend
them to meet and reflect contemporary conceptions of important
social values, such as equality and privacy. The practical effect of
Black's position was thus to give absolute effect to rights explicitly
enumerated in the Constitution, but to defer to legislative judgments concerning the weight and importance of interests upon
which the Constitution, as a literal document, was silent. Speaking
at the Columbia University Law School in 1968, Justice Black told
his audience that a majority of Supreme Court Justices had, on
occasion, used "due process" to strike down laws which the Justices had found to be "unreasonable," "arbitrary," "capricious" or
"contrary to a fundamental sense of civilized justice." The clause
had also been used, he said, to find unconstitutional trials and conduct which were "unfair," "shock[ed] the conscience," and "offend[ed] the community's sense of fair play and decency." Justice
Black continued:
I cannot subscribe to such a loose interpretation of due process
46.

G. WmrrE, THE AmmucAN JuDicLL TRArrMON: PROFLES OF LEADING AmmcAN

JUDGEs 334 (1976).

47. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293 (1964) (Black, J.,
concurring).
48. See, e.g., Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 476 (1966) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
49. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 578 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting in part);
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 166 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
50. 381 U.S. 479, 507 (1965).
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which in effect allows judges, and particularly justices of the
United States Supreme Court, to hold unconstitutional laws they
do not like. For what else is the meaning of "unreasonable," "arbitrary," or "capricious" -what sort of limitations or restrictions
do these phrases put on the power of judges? What, for example,
do the phrases "shock the conscience" or "offend the community's sense of fair play and decency" mean to you?51

Justice Black's concern was to impress upon his audience that the
expressions he quoted imposed precious few restrictions on judges

and left them entirely too free to decide constitutional questions
on the basis of their own policy judgments or inclinations. In re-

sponse to those who charged that his absolutism made him insensitive to possible improvements in constitutional law, Black liked to
respond that if "good" judges-judges who pleased their crit-

ics-sat on the Court today, what would happen when bad judges,
52
in different circumstances, sat on the Court?
Of course, in Dworkin's eyes, Black's absolutism denied Black
the opportunity to reconsider the rights of litigants in view of con-

temporary and enlightened moral argument; 53 the Justice's position ran afoul of the relativism thesis. In the field of civil rights, for
example, Black's theory makes a strict and literal construction of
the Constitution yield a narrow view of constitutional rights, because, as Dworkin says, such a view "limits such rights to those
recognized by a limited group of people at a fixed date of history."

Dworkin would argue that the constitutional language of

the First Amendment or the due process clause does not set out
the Framers' conceptions of freedom of speech or procedural jus51. H. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 24 (1968).
52. Id. at 11.
53. See Dworkin's views on strict interpretation of the Constitution, TRS, supra note
1, at 134-37.
It is interesting to note that if Hugo Black did not, in Dworkin's opinion, go far enough
as a liberal, Alexander M. Bickel considered Black far too great an activist. Bickel assailed
Black because he believed the latter's insistence that judges follow the literal text of the
Constitution was itself too convenient a cover for rampant "self-assertive subjectivism." A.
BIcKL, supra note 17, at 40, and A. BIcKEL, supra note 43, at 9. Bickel saw Black's literalist
and absolutist tendencies as a facade for the judge's own personal, subjective convictions.
"[T]he Court should not tell itself or the world," Bickel asserted, "that it draws decisions
from a text that is incapable of yielding them. That obscures the actual process of decision,
for the country, and for the judges themselves, if they fall in with the illusion. And it is a
menace, to the Court and to the country." A. BicKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANcH 96-97
(1962).
54. TRS, supra note 1, at 134. Dworkin is not speaking specifically of Black's view.
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tice as law. The Framers' conceptions, even if they had been reasonably precise in the eighteenth century, are incomplete and indeterminate in the circumstances of the twentieth century. Rather,
constitutional provisions must find their precise meaning in the
sense of justice and the moral insights of those for whom these
provisions are living realities. 55 These provisions consequently cannot have the fixed and absolute meaning Black attributed to them.
Both Dworkin and Black share the conviction that government should serve not only what we believe to be our present or
immediate interests, but should also serve certain "enduring values." Both might have agreed that the courts are especially capable
of penetrating our fleeting and transitory interests. In addition,
Dworkin alerts one to the danger that a constitution, the meaning
of which has become ossified and no longer capable of being revived in light of changing conceptions of key values, is an institution doomed to an increasingly marginal role in the social and political life of a nation. Indeed, Black's view of constitutional
interpretation is too inflexible; Black's judicial philosophy does not
adequately account for the vagueness and ambiguity in much of
the Constitution's language.
Yet, whatever its faults, Black's position does have a ruthlessly
logical consistency. Countering Dworkin, Black might well have argued that the Constitution's continued vitality and relevance to
contemporary problems was due to the permanence and consistency of the conception of rights it protected. It was a necessary
consequence of Black's logic that the Court itself must refrain from
stretching the meaning of a constitutional clause or adding substantive content to the document (even in a good cause, as in Griswold). Some provisions of the Constitution, most notably the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, have served as vessels into which judges have poured their
own substantive values. But Black believed that what the Court
gained in this manner could easily evaporate in the heat of political battle. Black did not want his brethren on the Court to "adapt
the Constitution to new times" or substitute the Court's own "poor
flexible imitations" for the rigid protection of known practices. 56
He was opposed to the infusion into the Constitution of Court-cre55. Id. at 134-37.
56. H. BLACK, supra note 51, at 20.
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ated, transitory and "evanescent" standards. Judicial initiative,
Black believed, could only result in a serious dilution and weakening of constitutional rights.5 These rights could remain real forces
in American political life only if they were understood to be rigid,
inelastic and generally impermeable to new trends or fashions in
thought and action. The lasting appeal of Justice Black's judicial
philosophy arises from his heroic insistence that certain "enduring
values"-those we regard as our rights-can be adequately protected only if they are given a "hard core" of meaning and are recognized as resilient, timeless and absolute.5 8
Black's position highlights my first criticism of Dworkin,
which focuses on his belief that judges can base their decisions in
hard cases on the rights of the litigants and, at the same time, justify their decisions by appeal to new and original conceptions of
what those rights are. Though Dworkin's analysis involves both the
rights thesis and the relativism thesis, the latter undermines Dworkin's contention that judges can justify their decisions as resting on
the actual rights individuals possess. Black's position makes. clear
the difficulty with Dworkin's thesis. If rights have a fixed and unitary definition (presented through both precedent and historical
tradition) as Black believed they do, then it should be possible to
explicitly determine whether public policies encroach upon these
rights. However, it is equally clear that Black's account of rights
will not support the expansion of legal protection associated with
judicial originality. On the other hand, if our concepts of fundamental rights lack the unitary character and definite boundaries
Black thought they had, then when judges depart from precedent
to reach decisions in hard cases it will become difficult to agree
that judicial decisions are justified as based on rights at all.
Consider the many references made today to a "right to
know," a "right to work," a "right to a minimum wage," a "right to
health care," a "right to equal respect as a person" and even a
"right to life." Are these expressions (like the popular nineteenth
century notion of "freedom of contract") anything more than allu57. "The majority's approach makes the First Amendment, not the rigid protection of
liberty its language imports, but a poor flexible imitation.... The Founders of this Nation
were not then willing to trust the definition of First Amendment freedoms to Congress or
this Court, nor am I now." Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431, 445 (1961) (Black, J.,

dissenting).
58. See McCart v. Indianapolis Water Co., 302 U.S. 419, 423 (1937) (Black, J., dissenting); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971)..
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sions to ideal directives?9 The "right to know" and the "right to
life" are not the name of specific rights, like the right to vote or
the right not to self-incriminate, and to simply acknowledge that
all persons have such "rights" is to say very little indeed about the
nature of these rights. For example, whether the "right to life"
rules out capital punishment, abortion or mercy killing, are questions whose rival answers are all compatible with one or another
interpretation of this alleged universal right. Thus, commitments
to such putative rights are best understood as endorsements of
more or less vague ideals; 0 and these ideals may direct our efforts
over conflicting courses depending upon the availability of certain
knowledge, the strength of moral intuitions, and other considerations, some of an entirely adventitious nature. These matters are
complicated by the fact that every claim recognized as a right of
some implies obligations of others, in the sense that if some person
has a right to something, some other person is obligated to provide
it or at least not interfere with the enjoyment of it. 1 The hazards
of working injustice under the enchantment of a claim to a right,
or of being too ready to commit public resources or state coercion
to the pursuit of an ideal, are familiar enough not to need
elaboration.
Dworkin himself deflates talk of a "right to conscience" and a
general "right to liberty," which he opposes as confused and misleading. 62 It is probable that Dworkin would also hesitate to recognize phrases like the "right to life" or the "right to know" as
names for fundamental moral rights in the way in which "free
speech" designates the fundamental right to freely exchange ideas.
Consequently, he might respond that these fears of uncertainty
and confusion are exaggerated in the case of fundamental rights
which have extensive legal histories and strong traditional roles in
59.

See generally J. FNMERG, SocuL PHmtosoPHY 71 (1973). The Universal Declara-

tion of Human Rights adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 10, 1948, refers to the following "rights" (among many others): the "right to a national-

ity" (art. 15); the "right to social security" (art. 22); the "right to rest and leisure" (art. 24);
the "right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of

his family" (art. 25); and the "right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community" (art. 27).
60. See J. FENBERG, supra note 59, at 71.
61. See, e.g., S. Ban AND R. PzTm, Tim PRINCIPLES OF POLMCAL THOUGHT 102
(1964); J. HosPERs, HuMAN CoNDuar 386 (1961).
62. See TRS, supra note 1, at 189-90, 266-72.
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our moral patterns of thought.6 3 Nevertheless, there is an important difference between merely depending upon the belief that
others will be influenced or moved by principles of justice, charity
or other moral considerations, and being able to count upon one's
rights." Constitutional rights are definite and decisive in a way in
which moral principles (with their dimension of "weight") are not.
Thus, if individuals are to be able to rely upon fundamental rights,
then every such right, no matter how controversial its "penumbra,"
must have a clear central core which is permanently and unconditionally established.6 5 Judges and public officials must recognize
and stand by this central core of meaning. Otherwise, the possession of rights by individuals cannot act as a check upon policy formation which decisionmakers will respect.66
III
Ultimately, what separates Black and Dworkin is their entirely
different way of thinking about rights. Whatever the differences in
67
philosophy between Justice Black and a "natural rights" theorist,
both would agree that fundamental rights are necessarily imprescriptible and intransigent. Furthermore, both would agree that
fundamental human rights are universal-the same for all persons
at all times.68 Rights have a quality of permanence which does not
allow them to be substantively redefined or reinterpreted in different historical epochs. Dworkin must obviously reject this view as
incompatible with his relativism thesis. But what alternative account of rights can he provide? Indeed, what sort of theory of
63. There seems to me little difference between Dworkin's description of the right to
equal respect and the "rights" I have been describing in terms of ideal directives. See TRS,
supra note 1, at 182.
64. Feinberg, The Nature and Value of Rights, 4 J. VALUE INQUIRY 243 (1970).
65. Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424, 1438 (1962).
66. "Individual rights are political trumps held by individuals." TRS, supra note 1, at
xi.

67. "Black's theory... began with the assumption... that human nature was unchanging, and thus that principles of conduct established by one era could serve as guides
for the next." G. WHrr, supra note 46, at 332. Nevertheless, Black opposed what "he caricatured as the 'natural law-substantive due process-fundamental fairness' school of judging." Id. at 336.
68. The concept of fundamental natural or human rights includes the notion of equal
rights: if X has a right which is justified by some property possessed by X, then Y, who has
the same relevant property or characteristic, must have the same right. See Wasserstrom,
Rights, Human Rights, and Racial Discrimination,61 J. PHILOSOPHY 628 (1964), reprinted
in HUMAN RIGHTS 96-110 (A. Melden ed. 1970).
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rights would enable Dworkin to avoid the existing tension between
the rights thesis and the relativism thesis? The question is difficult
to answer because Dworkin does not undertake a philosophical discussion of rights as such. Although the arguments of Taking
Rights Seriously require the philosophical groundwork, Dworkin
adds only a loose analysis of rights to his rights thesis and his argument for judicial activism. The discussion to follow will explain
why Dworkin fails to address the problem I have outlined.
In many passages throughout Taking Rights Seriously, Dworkin attacks the natural rights tradition. He states explicitly that he
has avoided describing the fundamental moral rights of individuals
as "natural" precisely to avoid the undesirable metaphysical associations the term brings with it. 9 His readers are not to think of
rights as "things." Nor are rights to be considered "spectral attributes worn by primitive men like amulets, which they carry into
civilization to ward off tyranny.

' 70

A theory of rights should not

view rights as properties or characteristics which naturally belong
to human beings, like a central nervous system or an upright
posture. 71
For his part, Dworkin pursues a "demythologized analysis"
and speaks of his notion of rights as "low-keyed. 7' 2 His analysis is
"not . . . metaphysically ambitious, '7 - in fact, it is entirely cut

away from the ontological assumptions of the classical natural
rights position. In contrast with the notion of rights as "absolute,"
Dworkin says that rights can conflict or "compete"; 74 they are relative and can be ranked according to how important or fundamental
they are.75 It is very much the job of governing "to 'define' moral
rights through statutes and judicial decisions, that is, to declare
officially the extent that moral rights will be taken to have in
69. TRS, supra note 1, at 176.
70. Id.
71. "A great many lawyers are wary of talking about moral rights .. . because they
suppose that rights, if they exist at all, are spooky sorts of things that men and women have
in much the same way as they have non-spooky things like tonsils." TRS, supra note 1, at
139.
Common human qualities that have often been cited as the ground for natural rights
include rationality, the capacity to feel pain and undergo suffering, the ability to form a
rational plan of life, and the need for the affection and companionship of others.
72. Id. at 138.
73. Id. at 177.
74. Id. at 193-94.
75. Id.
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law."'76 Furthermore, even the most important of them can be "cut
77
off" when there are "compelling" reasons to do so.

According to this analysis of rights, we need not look to the
particular characteristics of persons to determine whether they
have rights. Indeed, some legal "persons" (such as corporations)
which have not traditionally been regarded as rights holders can be
said to have rights by this analysis. When judges "define" the
rights of those before their courts, in Dworkin's view they cannot
search for some special attribute, quality or status which one of the
parties may possess. According to this low-keyed analysis of moral
rights, "a man has a moral right against the state if for some reason the state would do wrong to treat him in a certain way
... .,,7

The only evidence Dworkin would allow to prove the exis-

tence of a moral right is a persuasive moral argument-that is, the
presence of persuasive reasons why it is wrong to treat this individual as he is treated. Rights are to be characterized by the relative
strength of principles supporting that which their holder proposes
to do or get (or which others propose to give or do for him),
weighed against the strength of competing principles. Dworkin
says, "the sense of rights I propose to use . . . simply shows a

claim of right to be a special, in the sense of a restricted, sort of
'79
judgment about what is right or wrong for governments to do.
Thus Dworkin analyzes rights entirely in terms of reasons for
action. Dworkin is developing what has come to be known as the
"good reasons" analysis of rights in philosophical research.80 Dworkin has been strongly influenced by a philosophical reexamination
of the nature of rights. H.L.A. Hart, who was at the forefront of
this philosophical development, has asserted that "[t]o have a
right entails having a moral justification for limiting another's freedom and for determining how he shall act." 81 Hart added:
76. Id. at 197.
77. Id. at 200. Of course, the compelling reasons Dworkin has in mind are all moral
reasons of the weightiest kind. But it is significant that Dworkin does not recognize a difference of kind between having a right and undertaking or engaging in a practice strongly
supported by moral reasons. See generally my criticisms in Part IV herein.
78. TRS, supra note 1, at 139. Compare id. at 188.
79. Id. at 139.
80. See A. MELDEN, RIGHTS AND RIGHT CONDUCT (1959); Hart, Are There Any Natural
Rights? 64 PHEOSOPHicAI REV. 175 (1955); Hart, Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence,
70 LAW Q. REv. 37 (1954); Haworth, Utility and Rights, in STUDIES IN MOM PHMLOSOPHY 64
(N. Rescher ed. 1968).
81. Hart, Are There Any NaturalRights? supra note 80, at 183.
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The characteristic function in moral discourse of those sentences
in which the meaning of the expression "a right" is to be found:
"I have a right to.

.

.," "You have no right to.

.

.," "What right

have you to .. .?" is to bring to bear on interference with another's freedom or on claims to interfere, a type of moral evaluation or criticism, specifically appropriate to interfere with
freedom .... 82
To have a right, then, is to have a claim against someone, recognition of which is appropriate under some set of governing rules or
moral principles.88 The moral rights we enjoy as members of this
society are dependent upon our ability and willingness to recognize
and accept certain moral reasons as good reasons for giving things
to people, or for treating or refusing to treat people in certain
ways. Rights are contextually dependent upon political and moral
theories of the nature of man, of the community individuals should
have, and of the goals they ought to share.
One should for this reason expect to find in Taking Rights Seriously some discussion of the connection between rights as good
reasons and general political theories. Dworkin makes this connection in an extensive, analytical treatment of the relationship of
rights to political aims and theory construction:
I begin with the idea of a political aim as a generic political justification. A political theory takes a certain state of affairs as a political aim if, for that theory, it counts in favor of any political
decision that the decision is likely to advance, or to protect, that
state of affairs, and counts against the decision that it will retard
or endanger it. A political right is an individuated political aim.
An individual has a right to some opportunity or resource or liberty if it counts in favor of a political decision that the decision is
likely to advance or protect the state of affairs in which he enjoys
the right, even when no other political aim is served and some
political aim is disserved thereby, and counts against that decision that it will retard or endanger that state of affairs, even when
8
some other political aim is thereby served. '

Dworkin's view leads to a conception of political rights as part of a
justification for political aims which themselves play an integral
role in a general political theory. For example, since reserving
places in the entering class of a medical school exclusively for mi82. Id. at 178.
83. See Feinberg, supra note 64.
84. TRS, supra note 1, at 91.
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nority students arguably promotes a policy of affirmative action,
then affirmative action is a political aim in keeping with a democratic theory advocating equal respect for all persons. Thus, affirmative action justifies the university's admissions program, and is
itself justified by the broader democratic principles it would advance. Furthermore, since political rights are kinds of political
aims-"individuated political aims,"85--whether a minority
student has a right to a place in the entering class will depend upon
the structure of the political theory and its relation to the political
aim subsumed by it. As Dworkin says, "the character of a political
aim-its standing as a right or goal-depends upon its place and
function within a single political theory."86
If Dworkin's philosophical analysis of rights were applied,
then judges would "define" rights by weighing the strength of principles within a single coherent political theory. Like political officials, judges would meet the requirements of Dworkin's "doctrine
of responsibility": "This doctrine states, in its most general form,
that political officials must make only such political decisions as
they can justify within a political theory that also justifies the
other decisions they propose to make. ' 87 Dworkin's doctrine of responsibility demands "articulate consistency,"'8 8 and a judge justifies a particular decision, under the doctrine, only if he shows the
decision and the principles supporting it to be consistent with earlier unrecanted decisions and with future decisions he is prepared
to make. 9
Using Dworkin's approach, justification for denying that
Bakke had a right to a place in the entering class of the medical
school would require a convincing argument demonstrating greater
consistency with past decisions and constitutional interpretation
than any contrary argument. The Bakke9" case was too recent to
be included in Dworkin's discussion, but he analyzes Defunis v.
Odegaard1 in this fashion in Chapter 9, distinguishing Sweatt v.
2 Dworkin describes how
Painter.
a philosophical judge might pro85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id. at 92.
Id. at 87.
Id. at 87-88.
Id. at 88.
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
416 U.S. 312 (1974).
339 U.S. 629 (1950). For Dworkin's discussion, see TRS, supra note 1, at 229-31.
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ceed according to his theory, inventing, for this purpose, a lawyer
of "superhuman skill, learning, patience and acumen," whom he
calls "Hercules." ' s Hercules is a judge in some representative
American jurisdiction who accepts the main uncontroversial constitutive and regulative rules of law in his jurisdiction. He develops
theories of what legislative purpose and legal principles require in
the area of constitutional law, statutory law and common law.
Dworkin's purpose in introducing Hercules is to illustrate the
model of judicial decisionmaking entailed by his analysis of rights
as good reasons in a political theory. Dworkin shows how decisions
about rights emerge and become justified through a process of theory construction. Let us follow a labor of Hercules in the area of
constitutional law. The legislature passes a law purporting to grant
free busing to children in parochial schools. Does this grant establish a religion in direct violation of the establishment clause of the
First Amendment? Does the child who appears before him have a
right to her bus ride? Hercules must answer these questions.
Hercules might begin, Dworkin says, "by asking why the constitution has any power at all to create or destroy rights." 94 The
answer to this question is that the Constitution sets out a general
political scheme, one that is sufficiently just to be regarded as settled. Hercules must next discover what this settled scheme of principles is. He must construct a constitutional theory tailored to the
values of this particular Constitution, including its establishment
provision. But more than one theory can accommodate the specific
provision about religion; thus, "Hercules must turn to the remaining constitutional rules and settled practices under these rules to
see which of these two theories provides a smoother fit with the
constitutional scheme as a whole. '95 Hercules must finally settle on
that theory which shows the provision to be justified by the right
of religious liberty. Hercules will see, however, that his theory is
insufficiently coicrete to decide the particular case before him. He
must proceed to consider competing conceptions of religious liberty; for example, he might consider whether a right to religious
liberty includes the right not to have one's taxes used for any purpose that helps a religion survive, or whether the liberty extends
only so far as to prohibit the use of taxes to benefit one religion at
93. TRS, supra note 1, at 105.
94. Id. at 106.
95. Id.
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the expense of another. 96

To justify his decision in the case before him, Hercules must
consider the meaning of religious liberty and indicate how his own
decision would meld with a general theory of constitutional
rights.97 Hercules' decision would be a product of the political theory best justifying all relevant enactments and sound legal precedents. This reconstruction98 is clearly required in Dworkin's
scheme, if Hercules is to determine whether or not the child had a
right to her bus ride. Hercules' labors therefore illustrate how completely Dworkin has adopted the "good reasons" analysis of rights.
Rights are to be understood entirely in terms of reasons for action,
particularly as these reasons are elaborated and supported in the
process of theory construction.
One now appreciates why Dworkin does not feel any tension
between the rights thesis and the relativism thesis. Dworkin's "theory" of rights is a theory of reasons for action. If Dworkin's analysis of rights is correct, then there is no inconsistency in saying both
that judges must protect the rights of individuals and that judges
may justify their decisions by reference to new and contemporary
moral views of what these rights are. There is no unavoidable tension between judicial originality and rights as long as a reconstruction of the development of a branch of law in a particular jurisdiction can be shown to be consistent with a new conception of the
right in question. The rights of individuals which justify judicial
decisions are not "found" through the process of legal reasonings;
they are not independent and intransigent reference points to
which the judicial decision must conform. Rather, rights are themselves a product of the process of legal reasoning: they emerge and
take shape as reasons for and against a course of action which are
weighed against a background theory of constitutional law.
In the case of religious liberty, Dworkin says of the judge
(Hercules) that "[h]e must decide which conception is a more satisfactory elaboration of the general idea of religious liberty."99 This
judge's definition of a right will depend upon conceptions of ourselves and our purpose which have changed with historical experience and fresh insight. Dworkin contends that conventional politi96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 107.
Id. at 105-23.
Id. at 107.
Id.
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cal morality will always be relevant to questions of the validity of a
law. 10 0 And there is no avoiding the fact that many of Hercules'
decisions will depend upon judgments of political theory that
might be made differently by different judges. 10 1
The "good reasons" or contextual analysis of rights has its
supporters in the philosophical community.10 2 Its most attractive
aspect as a theory of judicial decisionmaking is its requirement
that judges make rigorous use of reason. In hard cases judges must
show how their decisions fit into the context of a general political
theory. Thus, in an atmosphere of general moral skepticism and
failing faith in natural rights, some of the essays in Taking Right
Seriously constitute a significant attempt to show that when
judges reason about rights and obligations in hard cases they need
not plunge themselves into a sea of subjectivity. By emphasizing
the elaboration of reasons and the creative reconstruction of legal
theory, Dworkin believes judges can show a decision to be based on
conceptions of individual right rather than resulting from "legislating" interstitially to fill gaps in the law.
Of course, Dworkin's position would also justify a great deal of
judicial initiative. A widely recognized effect of Dworkin's approach is that it would allow and encourage judges to bring general
considerations about rights, supported by elements in the settled
law that are remote from the case at hand,10 3 to bear upon a controversial case. But while Dworkin's approach would justify judicial activism, it would also subject the judge's constitutional analysis of hard cases to rational standards of evaluation and criticism
which go well beyond our ability to discover unambiguous literal
meaning or determine the intentions of the Framers. Thus Dworkin might reasonably suppose that his method of analysis would
restore the rigorous use of reason, as well as principled judgment
and analytical coherence (qualities which some severe critics be100. Dworkin says in TRS, supra note 1, at 208: "In the United States, at least, almost
any law which a significant number of people would be tempted to disobey on moral
grounds would be doubtful-if not clearly invalid-on constitutional grounds as well." See
also id. at 122: "If [Hercules] believes, quite apart from any argument of consistency, that a
particular statute or decision was wrong because unfair, within the community's own concept of fairness, then that belief is sufficient to distinguish the decision, and make it
vulnerable."
101. Id. at 117.
102. See Golding, Towards a Theory of Human Rights, 52 THE MONIST 521 (1968).
103. Mackie, supra note 10, at 76.
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lieved the activist Warren Court lacked) to the judicial process.1 04
IV

If the analysis of rights discussed above is correct, then my
claim that the rights thesis and the relativism thesis do not belong
together is without merit. But is this analysis of rights correct? It
is not enough to be able to make decisions in hard cases which can
be supported by weighty moral reasons. Either individuals have
rights or they do not, and if they do, then these rights will function
as a veto over some of the possible decisions. Under Dworkin's
analysis, to say that a person (P) has a right to do something (S) is
to say that (after an assessment of the particular situation in which
the right is claimed) the reasons for permitting P to do S are
greater than the reasons against permitting this. The search for
reasons for and against P doing S is, of course, one which may permissibly range widely over constitutional law and political theory.
This analysis is not one which fosters much confidence that
judicial decisions enforce the rights of individuals.105 Furthermore,
the analysis rests upon philosophical assumptions which are questionable. But my intention is not to argue for this second conclusion. It is, as originally stated, to show that the arguments in Taking Rights Seriously do not work together as a theory of
constitutional law. Dworkin fails to fuse into a single coherent theory his portrayal of the way judges should justify their decisions in
hard cases and his analysis of individual rights. The problem has
simply shifted from one point to another in the network of arguments Dworkin presents. Whereas before one could view the difficulty as a tension between the rights thesis and the relativism thesis, now the difficulty arises from an ambiguity in the rights thesis
itself. Dworkin believes that judges will justify their decisions as
protecting the rights of individuals if they engage in the process of
legal reasoning he recommends. But this involves a confusion be104. A. BICKEL, supra note 17, at 81.
105. To say that an individual has a right to something is to say that there are certain
reasons which direct or limit others' actions with respect to that individual or something he
possesses. Thus, it is a truism that whatever right we may care to mention, there is always
the possibility of there being a weaker reason such that, if the right and that reason conflict,
the right overrides the reason. Thus, Dworkin's analyzing rights in terms of reasons leads to
this difficulty: merely asserting that individuals have rights does not shoW that these rights
are particularly strong or important considerations. See Raz, ProfessorDworkin's Theory of
Rights, supra note 10, at 126.
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tween (a) an individual's having a right the recognition of which
serves as a justification for a judicial decision, and (b) a justifiable
and principled decision. One effect of the latter is to lead one to
say of an individual in whose favor a decision was made, that he
may act or receive something as a matter of "right" or even as "his
right." But this is a far cry from the proposition that this individual had a right before the decision was made and that it is his
having the right which justifies the decision. Dworkin has not
shown both that judges should reason from changing conceptions
of rights and that, if they do, their decisions will be justified as
based
upon actual rights individuals possess.
4
Reexamining Dworkin's discussion of the rights thesis confirms that he does offer two different versions of it.
In Chapter 4, titled "Hard Cases," Dworkin explicitly introduces the rights thesis and devotes extensive discussion to it. In
the first section of Chapter 4, under the title "The Rights Thesis,"
Dworkin asserts, "I propose . . . the thesis that judicial decisions
in civil cases, even in hard cases like Spartan Steel, characteristically are and should be generated by principle not policy."1 06 This
thesis, which I shall refer to as T1 for convenience, is reiterated
elsewhere in the chapter. 107 In presenting this thesis Dworkin is
here (as elsewhere in the book) combating the view that judges are
deputy legislators, who exercise discretion and "legislate" interstitially to fill gaps in the law. Relying upon his distinction between
principles and policies, Dworkin argues that if judges were deputy
legislators, then the courts should follow arguments based on policies, and "judicial originality" could be faulted because it is antimajoritarian and disregards the nature and intensity of interests
distributed throughout the community. However, the argument
that the same standards ought to be applicable to both legislators
and courts must fail, Dworkin insists, because judges do not "make
law"; even in a hard case like Spartan Steel,0 8 where one might be
106. TRS, supra note 1, at 84. See also Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd. v. Martin & Co., 1
Q.B. 27 (1973).

107. Id. at 86, 96.
108. Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd. v. Martin & Co., 1 Q.B. 27 (1973). Employees of the
defendant had broken an electrical cable belonging to a power company that supplied power

to the plaintiff. The plaintiff's company was shut down while the cable was repaired. The
court had to decide whether to allow the plaintiff to recover for economic loss following
negligent damage to someone else's property. Lord Denning asserted that in a novel case
like Spartan Steel the court must be free to decide on policy grounds.
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tempted to expect a judicial exercise of discretion, the judge must
show that the plaintiff has a right to recover his damages. Thus his
decision has been generated by arguments of principle, not
politics. 109
Dworkin next restates the rights thesis as the thesis that "judicial decisions enforce existing political rights." 110 This description of the thesis will be designated T2. Does T2 say the same
thing as TI? Is the thesis that judicial decisions are and should be
generated by principle and not policy (Ti), the same as the thesis
that these decisions should enforce existing political rights (T2)?
They will appear to be the same only if one assumes that Dworkin's account of rights as good reasons is correct. After all, it is not
hard to see why Dworkin would conflate T1 and T2. If rights are
generated by the reconstruction of a political theory (as illustrated
by the labors of Hercules) then a thesis about the way judges
ought to proceed in hard cases is at the same time a thesis about
individual rights. However, if one does not assume the correctness
of Dworkin's analysis of rights, T1 and T2 do not say the same
thing. To illustrate this, it is useful to recall the distinction between legal rights and moral rights ("political rights" is ambiguous)."' Judges cannot be said to enforce existing legal rights because hard cases are precisely those cases in which the legal rights
of the contestants are undetermined. And if one conceives of rights
as existing independently of theory construction, for example, as
properties inhering in persons rather than as good reasons for action, then it is apparent that a court could enforce existing moral
rights while basing its decisions on policy considerations rather
than principles.
Arguments of principle and arguments of policy could lead to
the same conclusion in some cases, and a judge might simply set
aside the relevant principles thinking that policy considerations
more clearly justify his decision. The judge might believe that a
more persuasive case may be made for the enforcement of a right
by attaching it to a policy (such as policies regarding the best dis109. TRS, supra note 1, at 84. See also id. at 22-23.
110. Id. at 87.
111. It is well to recall the distinction between moral and legal rights, for it does not
follow that if an individual lacks a legal right to do or have something then he lacks the
moral right to it as well. Moreover, moral rights do not necessarily follow from the possession of legal rights.
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tribution of liabilities for industrial accidents).
Furthermore, can it be meaningfully asserted that judges enforce an existing moral right, given Dworkin's own analysis of
rights? What possible evidence could Dworkin adduce to support
such a claim? Any principles or reasons available to prove the existence of such a moral right are principles or reasons the judge
might also use to justify his decision that the plaintiff (or defendant) has a legal right. That is, there is no evidence which can be
used to support unequivocally the existence of the plaintiff's moral
right without also supporting the existence of his legal right. Only
in those cases where judges fail to recognize what knowledgeable
critics would view as the legal rights of a litigant would the existence of independent moral rights seem to be demonstrated. But
these are the very cases Dworkin would want to classify as "mis112
takes" on the part of the judge.
If judicial decisions do enforce existing political rights (as T2
asserts), then there must be separate moral rights which predate
the creation of the legal rights. This would reasonably explain
what the Supreme Court did in the contraception case, Griswold v.
Connecticut,113 for example. By arguing that the right to privacy is
within the "penumbra" of other constitutionally protected rights,
the late Justice Douglas may have been straining to bring this particular decision in line with legal precedent. But it seems more
plausible to argue that plaintiffs had a moral right to privacy
before the Court's decision, despite there having been no legal
right at that time. A persuasive demonstration that persons have a
moral right to privacy is not dependent upon proving the existence
of a legal right to privacy. However, if rights are good reasons for
action, as Dworkin says they are, then there is no independent argument needed to establish the existence of these moral rights.
Therefore, it is simply misleading for Dworkin to say that
judges "enforce existing political rights." The language of T2 suggests that a judge in a hard case like Spartan Steel enforces rights
which preexist the judge's decision. In fact, in Dworkin's view, such
a right can be said to "exist" only in the sense that when the contestants come to court, the legal developments in the constitutional
history of the jurisdiction converge and are given effect by the
112.
113.

See TRS, supra note 1, at 118-23.
381 U.S. at 479-80.
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judge. 114 Both plaintiff and defendant will have moral claims or entitlements to some degree relevant to the conflict at hand. But the
precise nature of their rights does not take definite shape until the
facts are reviewed, the applicable principles are weighed, and the
controversy is well on its way to a legal resolution. The right hangs
in the balance, so to speak, when the case comes to court, and it
does not exist for the particular litigant until after the judge's decision has been made. Thus, it is more accurate to say that in hard
cases contestants come to court to see what their respective rights
will be, rather than that they come to court to have one or the
other's right enforced. 1 5
In seeking to justify judicial activism, Dworkin argues that appellate courts need not be restrained by past moral conceptions
embedded in the language of the Constitution or other documents
revealing the intentions of the Framers, and that judges must be
free to re-interpret constitutional provisions in terms of present
moral conceptions. This is the relativism thesis. It is a defense of
judicial originality often challenged by those who regard it as antidemocratic because they believe such changes should be left to
the more representative legislative bodies. To counter this challenge Dworkin relies upon his distinction between arguments of
principle and arguments of policy. Legislatures are better able to
settle matters of policy, but policy is not the concern of the courts.
The responsibility of the courts is to reach decisions after weighing
arguments of principle. Dworkin maintains that judges who base
their decisions on policy considerations .cannot show that either
party has a right to what is legally required of the other party.
Thus, Dworkin claims that only those judicial decisions which rest
on well-reasoned and well-supported arguments of principle are
justified.
114. Dworkin says, "Political rights are creatures of both history and morality." TRS,
supra note 1, at 87.
115. The really hard cases are perplexing precisely because the positions of both defendant and plaintiff seem equally well-supported by principles. Candor should require that
we admit that neither party has a right until the judge's decision is made, or at least that we
cannot tell what those rights are. Dworkin obviously wants to avoid both alternatives for
they will both lead to judicial discretion. If we admit that neither party has a right until a
decision is enforced, then we admit that judges sometimes "legislate" to create rights. On
the other hand, if we say there is no one right answer-that no single answer is dictated by
the theory the judge re-creates-then we get back to judicial choice by a different route.
Either way, it is implausible to say that the judge justifies his decision as enforcing an existing right.
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But what, in turn, justifies a judicial decision based on an argument of principle? In other words, what supports or justifies Ti?
Dworkin's view is that by employing arguments of principle, judges
"discover" the moral rights of individuals. And it is the fact that
one individual has a moral right which justifies the judge's decision
in a particular case. The activist judge does not invent or create a
right in hard cases, according to Dworkin, he discovers and enforces an existing right. Thus, Dworkin needs T2 to justify TI: the
justification for Dworkin's recommended means of judicial decisionmaking is that it enforces the rights of individuals.
The rights thesis expressed as T1 is not identical to T2, although Dworkin refers to both as the same thesis. What then is the
logical connection between TI and T2? T1 (the claim that judges
base their decisions in hard cases on arguments of principle) requires at most that judges somehow determine or "define" the legal rights of contestants in hard cases. If T2 is the claim that
judges enforce existing moral rights, then Dworkin has not shown
that it entails such a defining of legal rights. In fact, it is unlikely
that Dworkin could show that T2 entails T1, both because his distinction between policies and principles is problematic, 116 and because judges may not need arguments of principle to enforce moral
rights (arguments of policy may suffice for some cases). The logical
connection betveen T1 and T2 is therefore one which falls short of
deductive validity.
Perhaps Dworkin would respond that T2 is a good reason for
accepting TI. The problem is that Dworkin has not given us an
independent argument to show that individuals have moral rights
in hard cases in addition to the legal rights and obligations the
judge announces. Dworkin's argument for T2 is the same as his
argument for TI; Dworkin does not distinguish them. Since T2 is
not independently justified, Dworkin is not entitled to use it as a
reason in support of his claim that judges must base their decisions
on arguments of principle (Ti).
The confusion underlying Dworkin's arguments for the rights
thesis, mentioned at the beginning of this section, is between (a)
an individual's having a right the recognition of which justifies a
judicial decision and (b) a judicial decision which is "right" because it is supported by moral principles. The former might show
116. See D. RicHARDS, supra note 20, and Wellington, supra note 20.
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that although judicial originality requires (and results in) changing
conceptions of constitutional rights, it is nevertheless firmly
grounded in rights individuals possess and does not catch judges in
a web of subjectivity. However, the latter seems to be all that
Dworkin has actually established, and it is not enough to defeat
the charge that judicial activism leads to subjectivity and judicial
"legislation." Dworkin has' not shown that respect for individual
rights justifies the method of judicial decisionmaking he recommends. Nor has he shown that judges who have made their decisions in the recommended manner have conclusively established
that the prevailing party in the case had a moral right to win (will
anyone who really takes rights seriously entrust them to the capacities of judges to do political and moral philosophizing?).
Can Dworkin bridge the"gap between having a right and justifying decisions by demonstrating how they are related to moral
reasons? There are two discussions in Taking Rights Seriously
which might be construed as arguments seeking to close this gap.
The first can be dismissed quickly, the second will require more
extensive consideration.
On the first page of his essay on hard cases, Dworkin says, "I
shall argue that even when no settled rule disposes of the case, one
party may nevertheless have a right to win. It remains the judge's
duty, even in hard cases, to discover what the rights of the parties
are, not to inve i new rights retrospectively. '117 Several pages
later, he asserts, "The rights thesis supposes that the right to win a
law suit is a genuine political right .
Now this "right to win" in hard cases might be thought to be
evidence of, or follow as a consequence of, some other moral right
the plaintiff or defendant might possess. Thus, it might be thought
that if either party in the legal contest has a "right to win," then
that party has this right because he or she has some other right
which determines the outcome of the case. It might also be added
that since the judge has the responsibility of making a decision,
either the plaintiff or the defendant must have a "right to win."
However, this brief argument is entirely unpersuasive. The
"right to win" is only a confused shorthand for the right of both
contestants to an impartial and reasonable decision from the judge.
117.
118.

TRS, supra note 1, at 81.
Id. at 89.
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Given the institutional practices of courts as we know them and
the legitimate expectations of the parties, the "right to win" of the
plantiff (or defendant) must be understood in terms of the parties'
respective rights to the fairest and best decision the judge can reasonably be expected to make. Thus, if the plaintiff has a "right to
win" the particular case, this can mean only that the plaintiff's argument is, on the whole, stronger (weightier) than the defendant's;
it does not necessarily mean that the plaintiff had a preexisting
moral right. If the judge announces a decision for the plaintiff in a
hard case, we need not assume that the judge has discovered a
moral right possessed by the plaintiff which requires legal recognition. Rather, it is more likely that the judge has discovered that
the soundest of available arguments weighs in favor of the plaintiff, and the plaintiff's "right" to that decision is therefore a consequence of the judge's obligations to both parties in the dispute-that is, his obligation not to let personal bias or irrelevant
considerations cloud his judgment, and to reflect'as rationally and
deliberately as circumstances will allow. Thus the plaintiff's (or defendant's) "right to win" neither follows from a moral right which
determines the outcome of the case, nor is evidence of the existence of such a right.
A more significant attempt to close the gap occurs in Section 4
of the essay "Hard Cases." This argument and the extended example Dworkin presents of a referee settling a dispute in a chess tournament is worth discussing in detail, first, because this appears to
be the only other argument in Taking Rights Seriously attempting
to show that there- is no gap, and second, because Dworkin's discussion of a referee's efforts to settle a dispute in a chess game
serves as an analogy for the way Dworkin believes legal officials
should justify their decisions in hard cases.
Dworkin begins this part of "Hard Cases" by making a distinction between "institutional rights" and "background moral
rights."" 9 Judicial reasoning neither occurs in a vacuum, nor begins sui generis with the case at hand; it is always influenced to
some extent by precedent and other legal traditions. Furthermore,
the judge's activities occur within the framework of a special system, distinguished as a particular institution within the broader
political processes of the larger society, and related in complex
119. Id. at 101.
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ways to other social institutions such as legislatures, police departments, prisons and regulatory agencies. Some individuals have institutional rights by virtue of their participation in one or another
institution. In contrast, background moral rights provide an abstract justification for society's political decisions. 120 For example,
an indigent welfare mother may have a background moral right to
the use of public funds for an abortion, but whether such a background right is also an institutional legal right will depend upon
the applicability of legislation limiting the dispersal of public welfare funds for abortions, her standing to plead the unconstitutionality of such legislation, and the presence or absence of precedents,
analogies, or similar cases in her own and other jurisdictions,
among other factors.
The key feature of Dworkin's "institutional rights" is the fact
that they are rights conferred upon individuals by the circumstances of their participation in a particular activity or institution.
They are available only to participants in the recognized institution, and they confer upon participants rights to the positive actions of identifiable individuals. 121 The important implication of
this concept of rights for Dworkin's rights thesis is that litigants
bringing their controversy before the court can be said to have a
right to performance in conformity with their institutional right on
the part of the judge. Are these institutional rights thus moral
rights which individuals in all hard cases possess, and which justify
judicial decisions in these cases?
Closer inspection shows that these institutional rights can be
characterized in either of two ways. They may be described in
120.

Id.

121. This distinction between institutional rights and background rights parallels the
distinction between positive, in personam rights and rights in rem. See J. FEINBERG, supra
note 59, at 59-60. The distinguishing characteristic of in personam rights is that they are
correlated with specific duties of determinate individuals (e.g., the rights of creditors against
debtors, of landlords to collect rent from their tenants, and of the wrongfully injured to
damages from their injurers). By contrast, rights in rem are those said to be held not against
some specific nameable person or persons, but against "the world at large" (e.g., a homeowner's right to the peaceful occupancy of his own home, anyone's right to the use or possession
of his own money). In addition, a positive right is a right to other persons' positive actions,
while a negative right is a right to other persons' omissions or forbearances. Typically, in
personam rights are positive rights and in rem rights are negative rights.
The key feature of Dworkin's "institutional" rights is that they are positive, in personam rights while "background" rights, in addition to being abstract positive or negative
rights, are only rights in rem.
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terms of specific outcomes of institutional processes-for example
a chess contestant's right to a point for a forfeiture, or more generally, as the right of each participant to the impartial enforcement
of an institution's rules to the exclusion of all other rules. Phrased
in terms of Dworkin's chess allegory: "The participants entered the
tournament with the understanding that chess rules would apply;
they have genuine rights to the enforcement of these rules and no
others."1'22 In chess, as in other games characterized by an exhaustive set of rules, the outcome to which a contestant is entitled
would ordinarily be that which one would predict that the referee
would enforce if one had complete foreknowledge of all the factors
of skill and chance upon which the fortunes of the contestants
depend.
One's ability to predict the actual outcomes or decisions to
which the participants in a chess tournament have a right is facilitated by the fact that chess is almost completely governed by constitutive and regulative rules which belong distinctively to this
game and define it as a particular institution. Chess is, in this
sense, a largely "autonomous" institution because its constitutive
rules are sufficient to determine in most cases how the contestants
are to be scored. Legislatures, by contrast, are only partly autonomous because the rules which determine the makeup of legislatures, how they are to be elected and how they will vote, are rarely
sufficient to determine whether a citizen has a right, for example,
to minimum wage legislation.12 s The rules of a legislature are not
sufficiently complete or unequivocal to conclusively define the
rights of those who are participants in it, including the electorate
in a representative democracy. Legislatures are not completely autonomous in this sense.
One consequence of the difference between autonomous and
only partially autonomous institutions is that the institutional
rights of particpants in the latter can only rarely be characterized
in terms of specific outcomes; and because of the incompleteness of
the rules, these rights must necessarily be characterized in terms of
the rules and whatever other standards, expectations and customs
are relevant to the practice. Another consequence is that officials
in semi-autonomous institutions, like legislatures, are not fully in122.
123.

TRS, supra note 1, at 101.
Id.
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sulated from the considerations of background morality which infuse the community. Legislatures are guided only partially and imperfectly by institutional rules or "institutional constraints" and
must reach back to the moral standards of the community, and to
the community's conceptions of the nature and purpose of the institution, for guidance.
However, even in the case of a fully insulated institution, like
the game of chess, Dworkin feels that some rules will require interpretation or elaboration before an official will know how to adequately enforce them. 124 To use Dworkin's example, if a chess tour-

nament rule provides that the game shall be forfeited if one player
"unreasonably" annoys the other in the course of play, does a
player who continually smiles at his opponent in such a way as to
125
unnerve him, annoy him "unreasonably"?

What will be the participant's institutional rights in a hard
case such as the chess problem described here, or in an imperfectly
autonomous institution like a legislature? We cannot simply say
that the participants have a right to the enforcement of rules, because in the one case the extension or meaning of the rules may be
unclear, and in the other the applicable rules may simply be lacking. Thus, the most one can say about the participants in these
cases is that they have a right to that interpretation of the rules
which best protects the character of the institution or practice, 126
or that they are entitled to the official's best judgment about what
their rights under the rules are.127 In his most inclusive statement
on this problem Dworkin says, "individuals have a right to the consistent enforcement of the principles upon which their institutions
28
rely.

M

Dworkin's primary concern is to show that even in the hard
case posed by the chess problem, the referee is not free to legislate
interstitially within the "open texture" on imprecise rules, as
H.L.A. Hart and the legal positivists might believe. 2' Dworkin insists that "[i]f one interpretation of the forfeiture rule will protect
the character of the game, and another will not, then the partici124.

Id. at 102.

125. Id.
126. Id.
127.
128.

Id. at 104.
Id. at 126.

129.

See id. at 102; H. HART, THE CONcEpi

OF

LAW 121-32 (1961).
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pants, have a right to the first interpretation."' 1 0 The referee is obligated to consider the concept of intelligence, given that chess is a
game which requires intelligence, and to extend or reconstruct the
character of the game in such a way that he can show, by rational
argument, that continued smiling at an opponent either is or is not
within the meaning of "unreasonable annoyance." The referee
might reason that chess is a game which rewards the ability to concentrate and that when people concentrate they fall into all sorts
of bodily mannerisms, including contortions of their facial muscles.
Thus the referee might decide that the'player accused of annoying
his opponent should not forfeit the match. On the other hand, the
referee might reason that since chess requires enormous self-discipline as well as concentration, it is part of the contestants' normal
expectations that each will control himself so as not to distract the
other and that therefore the "faces" of the second player were either intentional or avoidable distractions. I In this case, the referee might award a point to the player who lodged the complaint.
The referee's decision, whatever it may be, will be controversial; there may be no essential agreement over his conceptual development of the notions of "intelligent behavior" and "concentration,'13 2 nor over the extent to which the features of chess actually
support the concept he advances. Nevertheless, Dworkin's contention is that the referee's decision must be supported by reasons
tied both to the character and traditions of the game and to defensible conceptions of the abilities required of contestants and their
manifestation in the game. It will then be possible, Dworkin believes, to say that either one of the contestants has a right to a
chess-point for a forfeit or that the other has a right to have the
game continue. This must be so because the referee's judgment will
be such as to justify recognizing it as a right; that is, his decision
will be supported by reasons sufficient to recognize a right on the
part of one of his contestants. Towards the close of his discussion
of institutional rights, Dworkin asserts that, "if the decision in a
hard case must be a decision about the rights of the parties, then
an official's reason for that judgment must be the sort of reason
that justifies recognizing or denying a right. He must bring to his
decision a general theory of why, in the case of his institution, the
130.
131.
132.

TRS, supra note 1, at 102.
See Dworkhn on Rights 19 PHIosoPmCAL BOOKS (1978).
TRS, supra note 1, at 103.
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rules create or destroy any rights at all, and he must show what
133
decision that general theory requires in the hard case."
However persuasive we may find Dworkin's argument as a recommendation for the way referees ought to justify decisions, it
does not show that these decisions are ultimately justified by the
moral rights of individual contestants. In the first place, the referee's exercise of his "best" judgment does not lead him to discover
some independent moral right of one of the contestants. The claim
that a contestant (let us say the player who complains of annoyance) has the right to a point logically requires that the referee be
obligated to give him the point. But the referee has such an obligation only after he is persuaded by conceptions of intelligence and
the character of the game which support this player's claim. The
assertion that a player has the right to the point before the referee
has made his decision only makes sense if the reconstruction of the
game requiring a decision in that player's favor is the only sensible
reconstruction possible. The player's right to the point is not a recognized and real right until the referee's reasoning has run its
course and the final decision has been rendered. Moreover, Dworkin admits that the referee might understand the concept of intelligence and the nature of the game differently, but still in a manner which he believes to be consistent with the players'
expectations-in which case the referee's "best" judgment will be a
completely different one. The rights of the players are therefore
contingent upon the official's recognition of his duty in light of
competing conceptions of the nature and purpose of chess and the
intellectual abilities required to do well in the game. Thus it is
simply gratuitous to say that the official discovers the rights of the
contestants, and it is plainly circular to argue that his final judgment is justified because it recognizes or enforces rights which contestants already have. There is simply nothing to be gained by
talking about the chess player's moral right to a point. Such talk is
only a vague and indirect way of expressing the view that the referee's judgment is justified.
Extrapolating a moral right to a specific outcome from the institutional right of a party will be even more difficult with respect
to a hard case in the law than it was in the chess example. A contestant in a chess tournament may plausibly be said to have a
133. Id. at 104.
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moral right to a point as an automatic consequence of the referee's
exercise of his best judgment, this being the sole determinant of
the rights in question; that is why the player's institutional right to
the efforts of the referee appear the same as his "right" to a point.
The rules of chess, like the rules of other highly-structured and
competitive games (and unlike the rules of semi-autonomous institutions), leave everything to the referee's discretion as the final determiner of who will be awarded points. The situation is quite different with respect to hard cases in the law.13 4 Whether a judge
may legitimately exercise a similar discretion to define rights and
fix obligations is a matter of considerable controversy. Indeed,
Dworkin argues that judicial decisions are not properly left to the
discretion of the judge.
The existence of an institutional right to specified types of
conduct by officials, even if it may also be considered a moral right,
will not embrace a moral right to a specific decision. There is,
therefore, no necessary logical connection between the institutional
rights of individuals and the moral rights necessary to justify any
particular judicial decision. Despite his efforts, Dworkin has not
bridged the gap between "having a right" and a "justified judicial
decision." If judicial officials proceed as Dworkin recommends-by
reconstructing the nature of the activity-they will make decisions
which can be justified as the best they can rationally produce.
There is much to recommend this procedure, but it is not a procedure which "discovers" or "enforces" individual rights in the
straightforward manner Dworkin would have his readers believe.
Judges may sometimes enforce rights which they have defined or
helped create, but in these cases the rights will be the consequence
of the process of elaboration and argument leading to judicial decisions, and not justifications for these decisions.
V
This article began with the observation that Dworkin's defense
of judicial activism requires him to develop both the rights thesis
and the relativism thesis. However, it is difficult to suppose that
judicial decisions protect and enforce individual rights when these
134.
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controversies of a particular type. However, these situations do not (by definition of 'hard
case') constitute hard cases.
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decisions are reached through changing conceptions of what these
rights ought to be. Some elements of the judicial philosophy of the
late Justice Black clarify my criticism of Dworkin. Justice Black
believed that the legal enforcement of rights requires fairly definite
and unitary conceptions of what these rights are. The rights of individuals cannot be effectively protected if much reinterpretation
or reconstruction of constitutional law is attempted.
Yet Dworkin believes an analysis of individual rights to be
consistent with the relativism thesis. Dworkin accepts a recent
philosophical account of rights which differs radically from Justice
Black's view of rights and from the natural rights tradition. This
latter analysis of rights postulates an individual's having a right as
the justification for providing the individual with some good or
protection. The rights of individuals are seen as good reasons for
action-good reasons which can be supported within a theory of
constitutional law and political purpose. If this theory is correct,
then it is not inconsistent to say both that individuals have definite rights and that these rights change according to context. But
this merely shifts the problem to the rights thesis itself. If rights
emerge in the process of reasoning which Dworkin outlines, then
this process of reasoning must be justified. Dworkin offers no support for the claim that judges (like Hercules) who follow the recommended procedure in hard cases will reach the right decisions.
It is not enough to assert that these decisions are correct because
they enforce the rights of individuals. Nor has Dworkin shown that
the institutional rights of the litigants in a hard case justify the
particular decision of the judge.
The verdict must be that Taking Rights Seriously does not
present a unified and coherent theory of constitutional law. A resolution of the difficulties I have discussed would require Dworkin to
reexamine the relationship between the different elements of his
philosophy of constitutional law. There are basically three components of this philosophy: an attempt to justify judicial activism, a
theory of individual rights, and a theory of judicial decisionmaking
for hard cases. In my opinion, the weakest component is Dworkin's
analysis of rights. A reconstruction of his arguments might therefore be undertaken with an eye toward pinpointing where the analysis of rights has failed. The general comments which follow only
suggest a possible direction for such an inquiry.
Given the crucial importance of individual rights, one must
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ask why persons recognize such rights in each other in the first
place. Rights and their correlative obligations are essentially social
in character; they are conferred by established morality. Thus, to
justify a claim of right one must show that the right is held by
members of a certain social group, and that one is a member of
that group. Each participating member of the group is entitled to
insist that other members do what is necessary to enable that
member to share in the common enterprise on terms consistent
with its nature and purpose, provided that that member act reciprocally towards them. Members of a common enterprise have good
reason to treat one another in ways consistent with the nature and
purpose of their enterprise. 3 5 Members of a social group ought to
have those rights which are necessary to their proper participation
in the joint activity. An unrecognized right may be defined as one
which a member of a group would be justified in claiming but
which is not at present recognized within the group. What justifies
the claim is not merely one's status as a member, but the nature
and purpose of the group's joint activity coupled with the factors
entitling one to participate in the group. 138
There must, therefore, be widespread agreement among the
members about the fundamental character of the group's way of
life if they are to agree which rights they ought to have. Absent
agreement about the terms upon which individuals are to share the
burdens and benefits of the society, there can be no basis for ascertaining the relevant grounds for recognizing claims for equal or differential treatment. There must be general consensus about the
nature and purpose of the society, or it will not be possible to determine whether individuals are acting responsibly and justly as
members of it. Members may treat each other's interests and
claims as equally meriting consideration only if the differences be13 7
tween them are not too serious and deep-seated.
This is why it was important for the Founding Fathers to believe that the Bill of Rights protections against governmental
transgressions were natural moral rights. The constitutional order
rests on the central proposition of natural rights theory, familiar to
the Founders through the work of John Locke.13 8 These rights are
135.
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"natural" in both the sense that all men taking part in a common
social life are presumed to have them, and in that they are not the
product of any legislation or convention, nor the consequence of
any special political union or relationship. One is a moral person
before one is a member of a political union; having joined such a
union, one retains this moral aspect. The people, for purposes of
the Constitution ("We, the People"), are all those whose interests
are considered within the entire framework, not the occasional majorities who have power to legislate within the constraints of the
Constitution.' 9 The point of a constitution of limited powers was
to provide fundamental constraints on the power of government by
majority rule, and this is, of course, also the ultimate justification
of judicial review.
However, confidence in the Court as a guardian of our enduring values is possible only if our conceptions of those rights remain
fairly consistent over time. The effectiveness of its protection will
diminish as ambiguity about the fundamental character of our way
of life increases. 140 Those who would justify judicial review, and
especially judicial activism, face a dilemma: though we rely upon
rights to provide the moral consensus behind attempts to expand
liberty and realize equality, at the same time controversies over the
rights and obligations arising out of these efforts generate uncertainty over the character of the consensus itself. Because our understanding of the rights the Constitution protects is a crucial part
of our way of life, we must move cautiously in changing or amending our conceptions of these rights. What is involved is more than
an attitude,1 41 or the potent symbolism of the Constitution and the

Court as forces for unity and continuity-it is our identity as a
united people and the integrity of our conceptions of the goals and
purposes we share.
Brandeis was partly correct when he claimed that "[o]ur Constitution is not a strait-jacket. It is a living organism. As such it is
capable of growth-of expansion and of adaptation to new conditions."1 42 Bickel was also partly correct in claiming that "[b]oth
139. D. RicHmms, supra note 20, at 42.
140. A. MLNE, supra note 135, at 169.
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Constitution and Court must remain above the day-to-day battle. ..

.""Is One can reasonably criticize conduct bespeaking a lack

of social responsibility and justice if one does not simultaneously
attack the fundamental character of our common life. Agreement
about the latter is presupposed and must be accepted as already
settled in order for dissent to be effectively communicated. It is on
this level that legislative enactments and judicial decisions are ordinarily criticized. But one must subject our fundamental principles of social union to a deeper level of scrutiny. Both types of
moral criticism are necessary, but the intelligibility and effectiveness of both are compromised if they are mixed indiscriminately.
Dworkin's view that judges justify their decisions on the basis of
individuals' rights, and that these rights are created by legal reasoning involving conceptions of what these rights ought to be, invites a confusion between these two levels of criticism. One would
expect a defense of judicial activism to succeed at the first level of
social criticism, which does not challenge the bedrock of rights recognized as fundamental to our common life. Judicial activism is
most acceptable as a check on majoritarian excesses, when it reaffirms our basic constitutional values by protecting individual
rights. However, Dworkin's analysis of rights as good reasons for
action attempts to consider rights at the second, deeper level. Reasons are neither "good" nor "bad" out of context, so Dworkin is
really reworking, and sometimes reinventing our basic and commonly held conceptions of social life and purpose. This reconstruction of constitutional theory is the sort of philosophical re-thinking
which enlightened citizens will wish to encourage in their communities. Nevertheless, one can hardly expect that the courts will be
eager to engage in it. The courts do not justify striking and original
decisions by telling us what to believe, but rather by reawakening
in us a deeper and richer appreciation of the basic principles we
accept. Thus, if having rights is nothing more than having good
reasons for one's position, then some consensus over what are good
reasons, or at least how they are to be discovered, must be developed. Until these basic principles have been reformulated it will
not be possible to have any criteria for judicial activism. Far from
requiring a re-interpretation of rights, a defense of judicial activism must wait for our conceptions of rights to meld and settle.

143. Id. at 105.

